Oxford Philosophical Monographs: Discrimination and Disrespect by Benjamin Eidelson book EPUB, DOC
9780198732877 0198732872 Everyone agrees that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something an act of discrimination, as well as precisely why (and hence when) such acts are wrong. In Discrimination and Disrespect, Benjamin Eidelson develops illuminating philosophical answers to these two questions. Discrimination is intrinsically wrong, Eidelson argues, when it manifests disrespect for the personhood of those it disfavours. He offers an original account of what such disrespect amounts to, explaining how attention to two different facets of moral personhood -- equality and autonomy -- ought to guide our judgments about wrongful discrimination. At the same time, however, Eidelson contends that many forms of discrimination are morally impeachable only on account of their contingent effects. The book concludes with a discussion of the moral arguments against racial profiling -- a practice that exemplifies how controversial forms of discrimination can be morally wrong without being intrinsically so., Hardly anyone disputes that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something discrimination, as well as precisely why (and hence when) acts of discrimination are wrong. Benjamin Eidelson develops systematic answers to those two questions. He argues that discrimination is a form of differential treatment distinguished by its special connection to the differential ascription of some property to different people. This simple conceptual analysis of discrimination dissolves certain recurrent puzzles. It also positions us to reconsider the derivative notion of indirect discrimination (or discrimination consisting in 'disparate impact'). Offering a revisionist account of that idea, the book explains why some such cases are reducible to 'direct' discrimination, and why others, although morally and legally suspect, may not best be thought of as 'discrimination' at all.Eidelson then argues that what makes some cases of discrimination intrinsically wrongful is that they manifest an attitude of disrespect for the personhood of those who are disfavored. He endeavors to specify what this attitude consists in, and to demonstrate how attending to its character can help us to better understand the moral dimensions of different forms of wrongful discrimination. Focusing on the distinct requirements of respect for the equality and autonomy of persons in turn, Eidelson explains why we condemn some cases of discrimination as strongly as we do and offers principles to guide our thinking where we are less certain. He concludes with an extended discussion of racial profiling in law enforcement.
9780198732877 0198732872 Everyone agrees that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something an act of discrimination, as well as precisely why (and hence when) such acts are wrong. In Discrimination and Disrespect, Benjamin Eidelson develops illuminating philosophical answers to these two questions. Discrimination is intrinsically wrong, Eidelson argues, when it manifests disrespect for the personhood of those it disfavours. He offers an original account of what such disrespect amounts to, explaining how attention to two different facets of moral personhood -- equality and autonomy -- ought to guide our judgments about wrongful discrimination. At the same time, however, Eidelson contends that many forms of discrimination are morally impeachable only on account of their contingent effects. The book concludes with a discussion of the moral arguments against racial profiling -- a practice that exemplifies how controversial forms of discrimination can be morally wrong without being intrinsically so., Hardly anyone disputes that discrimination can be a grave moral wrong. Yet this consensus masks fundamental disagreements about what makes something discrimination, as well as precisely why (and hence when) acts of discrimination are wrong. Benjamin Eidelson develops systematic answers to those two questions. He argues that discrimination is a form of differential treatment distinguished by its special connection to the differential ascription of some property to different people. This simple conceptual analysis of discrimination dissolves certain recurrent puzzles. It also positions us to reconsider the derivative notion of indirect discrimination (or discrimination consisting in 'disparate impact'). Offering a revisionist account of that idea, the book explains why some such cases are reducible to 'direct' discrimination, and why others, although morally and legally suspect, may not best be thought of as 'discrimination' at all.Eidelson then argues that what makes some cases of discrimination intrinsically wrongful is that they manifest an attitude of disrespect for the personhood of those who are disfavored. He endeavors to specify what this attitude consists in, and to demonstrate how attending to its character can help us to better understand the moral dimensions of different forms of wrongful discrimination. Focusing on the distinct requirements of respect for the equality and autonomy of persons in turn, Eidelson explains why we condemn some cases of discrimination as strongly as we do and offers principles to guide our thinking where we are less certain. He concludes with an extended discussion of racial profiling in law enforcement.